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YOU’LL NEVER WORK (OR PLAY) HERE 
AGAIN: A LINGERING QUESTION IN TITLE 
IX RETALIATION CLAIMS BROUGHT BY 
COACHES AND ATHLETES AFTER JACKSON 
V. BIRMINGHAM BOARD OF EDUCATION 
BRIAN L. PORTO* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Like many promising forty-year-olds, Title IX has already realized some 
significant achievements but has more to accomplish if it is to live up to its 
enormous potential.1  Regarding the achievements to date, various 
commentaries have described the social revolution to which Title IX has 
contributed mightily during the past four decades, especially the increased 
athletic-participation opportunities for girls and women.2  The New York 
Times recently sent its readers a charming postcard from that revolution, 
namely, a story about the homecoming queen at a Michigan high school who 
doubles as the place-kicker on her school’s football team, which would have 
been unthinkable when her grandparents were in high school.3  Still, hurdles 
remain to be cleared, not the least of which is an unfortunate tendency among 
schools and colleges to retaliate against whistleblowers who complain about 
the unequal treatment of male and female athletes. 
Perhaps the best known Title IX whistleblower in the United States is 
Roderick Jackson, the coach of a girls’ basketball team in Birmingham, 
Alabama, whose players had to practice in “an old, unheated gymnasium on a 
nonregulation-size court with bent rims,” while their male counterparts 
 
* Associate Professor, Vermont Law School. J.D., Indiana University-Bloomington, 1987; Ph.D. 
(Political Science), Miami University (Ohio), 1979; B.A., University of Rhode Island, 1974. 
1. Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2012). 
2. See, e.g., Brian L. Porto, Halfway Home: An Update on Title IX and College Sports, 34 VT. 
B.J. & L. DIG. 28, 28 (2008) (noting that the number of women playing varsity sports in college had 
increased from less than 30,000 to more than 180,000 since 1972 and that the percentage of female 
varsity athletes at American colleges and universities had increased to 45); see also NAT’L WOMEN’S 
LAW CTR., BARRIERS TO FAIR PLAY 1 (2007), available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/ 
pdfs/barrierstofairplay.pdf (citing similar statistics). 
3. Micheline Maynard, Even in a Locker Room Apart, an Undeniable Leap of Progress, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at SP12. 
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enjoyed the benefits of a new, heated gym.4  The girls were also forced to 
make do with less gym time, defective equipment, inequitable travel 
arrangements, and the absence of amenities such as an ice machine for 
supplying ice packs.5  Coach Jackson complained to the athletic director and 
the principal, but the only change that occurred was Jackson’s loss of his 
coaching job, although he kept his teaching position at the school.6  His efforts 
were ultimately rewarded, though, when the U.S. Supreme Court held in 
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education that “the private right of action 
implied by Title IX encompasses claims of retaliation . . . [when] the funding 
recipient [i.e., school or college] retaliates against an individual because he [or 
she] has complained about sex discrimination.”7 
The Jackson decision has had a major impact on Title IX jurisprudence by 
extending the statute’s reach to whistleblowers who suffer retaliation for 
demanding gender equity in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletic 
programs.  After Jackson, these individuals have a legal recourse that they 
lacked before 2005.8  Nevertheless, although Jackson has surely empowered 
whistleblowers, it has hardly ended retaliation against them, as several recent 
cases against a California university illustrate.  California State University, 
Fresno (Fresno State) “fired women’s volleyball coach Lindy Vivas in 2004 
and women’s basketball coach Stacy Johnson-Klein in 2005, after each 
woman complained about inequitable treatment of female athletes” by the 
Fresno State athletic department.9 
In the Vivas case, the athletic director claimed that Coach Vivas was fired 
for failing to meet performance clauses in her contract.  No such clauses 
existed in the employment contract of any other Fresno State coach, and the 
clauses only entered Vivas’ contract after she asked for a long-term contract in 
2003, having by then coached at Fresno State for twelve years.10  Moreover, 
one strains to imagine what performance clause Vivas could possibly have 
failed to meet because her career winning percentage was 0.612, she was a 
three-time Western Athletic Conference Coach of the Year, her teams had 
appeared in a postseason tournament six times, and the academic performance 
 
4. DEBORAH L. BRAKE, GETTING IN THE GAME: TITLE IX AND THE WOMEN’S SPORTS 
REVOLUTION 192 (2010). 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005). 
8. Porto, supra note 2, at 32. 
9. Id. 
10. Jill Lieber Steeg, “Hard Time” for Vivas During Tenure at Fresno State, USA TODAY ,May 
13, 2008, www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2008-05-12-titleix-vivas_N.htm. 
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of her players was exemplary.11  Under these circumstances, Vivas’ answer to 
the question of why she was fired rings true.  “‘The bottom line,’” she said, 
referring to her superiors in the athletic department, “‘is they did not like 
women who supported equity . . . .  It always came down to that.’”12  The jury 
in Vivas’ lawsuit against Fresno State agreed, awarding her a $5.85 million 
verdict in July 2007.13 
The Johnson-Klein case was more complicated than the Vivas case; 
Fresno State argued that it fired Johnson-Klein because she had obtained pain 
medication from one of her players and lied to university officials about 
having done so.14  Still, a jury awarded Johnson-Klein $19.1 million, which a 
judge reduced to $6.6 million in damages and $2.5 million in legal fees.15  The 
university appealed, but in June 2008, while the appeal was pending, the 
parties settled for $9 million.16 
In yet another case originating at Fresno State, the university, in October 
2007, paid former Associate Athletic Director Diane Milutinovich $3.5 million 
to settle her lawsuit, which she had filed in 2004, alleging that her 
reassignment from the athletic department, where she had been the senior 
women’s athletic administrator for twenty-one years, to the student union had 
been “retaliation for her advocacy of equal treatment for female athletes.”17 
The Fresno State cases may paint an unduly positive picture for Title IX 
advocates because they reflect only the circumstances in which a coach or 
athletic administrator challenged retaliation by filing a lawsuit.  On the other 
hand, a study by the National Women’s Law Center (NWLC) concluded that 
“[c]oaches fear retaliation if they complain [about Title IX violations], so the 
burden typically falls on students and their parents to protest 
discrimination.”18 




13. Sara Lipka, Fresno State Grapples with a Spate of Sex-Discrimination Claims, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 3, 2007, available at http://chronicle.com/article/Fresno-State-Grapples-With-
a/5794. 
14. Jill Lieber Steeg, Disputes Reflect Continuing Tension over Title IX, USA TODAY, May 13, 
2008, at 1A. 
15. Porto, supra note 2, at 32. 
16. See Stacy Johnson-Klein Resurfaces, ERRATIC MAGIC (July 17, 2008, 10:20 PM), 
http://www.erraticmagic.com/2008/07/stacy-johnson-klein-resurfaces.html. 
17. George Hostetter, Fresno State Suit is Settled for $3.5M: Multinovich’s Deal Resolves Her 
Sexual Discrimination Case Against the University, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 23, 2007, available at 
http://www.fresnobee.com/2007/10/12/162548/fresno-state-suit-is-settled-for.html. 
18. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 2, at 2. 
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the federal Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR), which is 
responsible for enforcing Title IX, between January 1, 2002, and December 
31, 2006.19  It found that, although coaches have greater access to information 
than their athletes and are often in the best position to identify and challenge 
discrimination, they filed fewer than eight percent (32 of 416) of the 
complaints made within the period of the study.20  Yet, sixteen of the thirty-
two complaints by coaches, or fifty percent, “alleged retaliation in addition to 
other forms of discrimination against [themselves] and their female 
athletes.”21  The form of discrimination against female athletes most often 
alleged was inequitable treatment.  Of the 416 complaints studied, females 
filed 375, of which 269 (almost 60%) alleged inequitable treatment of girls’ or 
women’s teams regarding equipment, supplies, scheduling, financial support, 
facilities, coaching, medical assistance, or publicity.22  Nearly thirty percent of 
the complaints filed by females alleged a lack of athletic participation 
opportunities for female students.23 
The Fresno State cases and the NWLC study show that many inequities 
remain for girls and women in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics.  
Under these circumstances, coaches and athletes will continue to lodge 
complaints and, presumably, suffer retaliation as a result.  In this environment, 
it is important to know how broadly post-Jackson courts will interpret existing 
law to facilitate successful Title IX-based retaliation actions by coaches and 
athletes.  Specifically, Title IX advocates wish to know if the law will protect 
from retaliation a complainant who mistakenly contends that his or her 
institution has violated Title IX.24  This Article will discuss alternative 
answers to that question and will offer an answer of its own. 
Part II will discuss the Supreme Court’s decision and its reasoning in 
Jackson.  Part III will present the evidence for a continuing problem, after 
Jackson, of retaliation against coaches who challenge their institutions’ 
alleged noncompliance with Title IX.  Part IV will turn to the question noted 
above, addressing both the problems inherent in trying to answer it and the 
alternative answers that various scholars have offered.  Part V will recommend 
using either a contextual reasonableness or a good faith standard, instead of 
the existing reasonable belief standard, to determine whether a plaintiff in a 
Title IX retaliation action honestly thought the underlying conduct originally 
 
19. Id. at 1. 
20. Id. at 2. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 3–4. 
23. Id. at 4. 
24. BRAKE, supra note 4, at 193. 
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complained of was unlawful.  Either recommended alternative reflects the 
youth and lack of legal sophistication of many Title IX complainants, and the 
remedial purpose of Title IX, better than the reasonable belief standard does.  
Part VI will conclude that the fortieth anniversary of Title IX provides a 
wonderful opportunity to adopt a broad rule of interpretation designed to 
protect from retaliation well-intentioned, but mistaken, Title IX complainants. 
II.  THE JACKSON DECISION 
Roderick Jackson sued the Birmingham School Board, alleging that it had 
retaliated against him, in violation of Title IX, for complaining about sex 
discrimination in the athletic program at the high school where he coached.25  
At issue in Jackson was “whether the implied private right of action in Title 
IX encompasses claims of retaliation.”26  The five-member Court majority 
(O’Connor, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) held that “it does where 
the funding recipient retaliates against an individual because he has 
complained about sex discrimination.”27 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, noted that Jackson’s team had 
not received funding or access to equipment and facilities that was comparable 
to what the school’s male athletes enjoyed, to the point that Jackson found it 
difficult to coach his team properly.28  His complaints to supervisors, 
including the athletic director at his school, who was also the boys’ basketball 
coach, went unanswered but not unpunished.29  In return for his complaints, 
Jackson began to receive negative work evaluations, and he was ultimately 
fired as a coach.30 
When Jackson filed suit, the district court granted the school board’s 
motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed.31  According to the appellate court, Title IX did not create a private 
right of action encompassing retaliation, and, even if it did, Jackson would not 
have been entitled to relief because, not having suffered sex discrimination, he 
was not within the class of persons whom the statute protected.32 
The Supreme Court reversed, as Justice O’Connor observed that Title IX 
swept broadly in prohibiting funding recipients from subjecting any person to 
 




29. Id. at 171–72. 
30. Id. at 172. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
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“‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex.’”33  In her view, “Retaliation against a 
person because that person has complained of sex discrimination is another 
form of intentional sex discrimination [under Title IX].”34  “Retaliation,” she 
added, “is, by definition, an intentional act.”35  It is discrimination because it 
subjects the complaining party to differential treatment, and it “is 
discrimination ‘on the basis of sex’ because it is an intentional response 
to . . . an allegation of sex discrimination.”36 
In support of this view, Justice O’Connor noted that Congress has often 
construed the term “discrimination” broadly within the Title IX context, which 
the Eleventh Circuit ignored in holding that the statute does not prohibit 
retaliation because it does not mention retaliation.37  After all, O’Connor 
pointed out, Title IX does not mention sexual harassment either, but the Court 
has held that sexual harassment is intentional discrimination to which the 
private right of action under Title IX extends.38  Indeed, she reasoned, 
Congress did not identify any specific discriminatory practices in Title IX; 
therefore, its failure to mention retaliation “does not tell us anything about 
whether it intended that practice to be covered.”39 
Furthermore, O’Connor opined, Congress enacted Title IX just three years 
after the Court decided Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,40 which held that 
42 U.S.C. § 1982, a statute prohibiting racial discrimination in buying, leasing, 
and selling real and personal property, also prohibited retaliation against a 
white man who had leased real property to a black man.41  Under those 
circumstances, she continued, it was reasonable to presume that Congress was 
familiar with the Sullivan decision when it enacted Title IX and that 
lawmakers expected courts to interpret Title IX in conformity with Sullivan.42  
Thus, the Supreme Court majority rejected the Birmingham School Board’s 
argument that the private right of action in Title IX does not extend to actions 
for retaliation. 
The majority also rejected the school board’s contention that even if Title 
IX applied to retaliation actions, it would not apply to Roderick Jackson’s 
 
33. Id. at 173 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2005)). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 173–74. 
36. Id. at 174. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 74–75 (1992)). 
39. Id. at 175. 
40. 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
41. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176. 
42. Id. 
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action because he was, at most, an “indirect victim” of sex discrimination.43  
Justice O’Connor answered this argument by observing, once again, that Title 
IX is broadly worded, and, more precisely, that it does not require that the 
victim of retaliation also be the victim of the sex discrimination that prompted 
both the retaliation and the lawsuit.44  For the school board’s interpretation to 
be correct, she reasoned, the statute would have had to state that “‘no person 
shall be subjected to discrimination on the basis of such individual’s sex.’”45  
Because it did not so state, and because the broad interpretation of “on the 
basis of sex” captured the spirit of the Sullivan decision, the Court concluded 
that Roderick Jackson was within the class of persons whom Congress 
envisioned bringing retaliation actions under Title IX’s auspices.46 
Finally, Justice O’Connor added, if Title IX were construed so as to 
preclude actions for retaliation, “individuals who witness discrimination would 
be loathe to report it, and all manner of Title IX violations might go 
unremedied as a result.”47  “Indeed,” she emphasized, “if retaliation were not 
prohibited, Title IX’s enforcement scheme would unravel.”48  Besides, she 
concluded, “teachers and coaches such as Jackson are often in the best position 
to vindicate the rights of their students because they are better able to identify 
discrimination and bring it to the attention of administrators.”49 
Thus, the Jackson majority held that the implied private right of action in 
Title IX encompassed actions for retaliation in addition to actions alleging sex 
discrimination.  The Court held further that Title IX protected not only victims 
of sex discrimination but also persons who suffered retaliation after 
complaining about sex discrimination against others.50 
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and 
Justice Scalia, countered that both of the majority’s conclusions were 
incorrect.  First, he observed, Title IX does not protect victims of retaliation 
because “retaliatory conduct is not discrimination on the basis of sex” within 
the meaning of Title IX.51  Second, he argued, “the natural meaning of the 
phrase ‘on the basis of sex’ is on the basis of the plaintiff’s sex, not the sex of 
 
43. Id. at 179. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. (emphasis in original). 
46. Id. at 179–80. 
47. Id. at 180. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 181. 
50. Id. at 174. 
51. Id. at 184 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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[someone else].”52 
In Justice Thomas’ view, Title IX did not protect Roderick Jackson’s 
retaliation claim because that claim was unrelated to actual sex 
discrimination.53  Instead, Thomas noted, Jackson alleged “that he suffered 
reprisal because he complained about sex discrimination, not that the sex 
discrimination underlying his complaint [had actually] occurred.”54  Under 
these circumstances, Justice Thomas reasoned, retaliation cannot be 
discrimination on the basis of sex “because a retaliation claim may succeed 
where no sex discrimination ever took place.”55 
Moreover, if Congress had intended Title IX to extend to retaliation 
claims, it would have included in that statute a separate provision addressing 
retaliation, as it did in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act56 (by prohibiting 
employment discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and national origin), 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),57 and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA).58  According to Justice Thomas, the presence of a 
retaliation provision in Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA plainly indicates 
that “when Congress intends to include a prohibition against retaliation in a 
statute, it does so.”59  Thus, he concluded, Congress did not intend that Title 
IX would extend to actions seeking to recover damages for retaliation.60 
Furthermore, Justice Thomas argued, even if Title IX extended to 
retaliation actions, it would not benefit Roderick Jackson because he had not 
suffered sex discrimination.  In Thomas’ view, discrimination “on the basis of 
sex” means discrimination on the basis of the claimant’s sex, as Congress 
made clear in Title VII with respect to discrimination against pregnant 
women61 and as the Court consistently held in lawsuits alleging sex 
discrimination.62  But, in this case, Jackson did not claim that his own sex was 
responsible for his superiors’ decision to relieve him of his coaching duties.63  
Therefore, Justice Thomas concluded, the plain language of Title IX, 
 
52. Id. at 185. 
53. Id. at 186–87. 
54. Id. at 187. 
55. Id. at 188. 
56. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012). 
57. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2012). 
58. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2012). 
59. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 190 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
60. See id. at 196. 
61. Id. at 185 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005)). 
62. Id. at 186 (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993); United States v. 
Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 239 (1992); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)). 
63. Id. at 186. 
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prohibiting discrimination “on the basis of sex,” did not encompass retaliation 
as Roderick Jackson experienced it.64 
Justice O’Connor’s view prevailed in the Jackson case, though, extending 
the statute’s reach beyond the direct victims of sex discrimination to 
whistleblowers challenging sex discrimination against others in sports.65  In so 
doing, Professor Deborah Brake has noted, Jackson made all Americans 
stakeholders in the enterprise of social equality and encouraged them to pursue 
it by “ground[ing] Title IX’s protection from retaliation in what people do to 
challenge gender inequality and not in their status as women or as athletes.”66 
III.  SEX DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN INTERSCHOLASTIC AND 
INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORTS: THE POST-JACKSON LANDSCAPE 
Jackson’s protection for Title IX whistleblowers has come not a moment 
too soon because ample evidence exists that sex discrimination, and retaliation 
for complaining about such discrimination, remain common in both school and 
college sports.  Recall that the NWLC studied 416 athletics complaints filed 
with or prepared by OCR between January 1, 2002, and December 31, 2006.67  
Female athletes filed 375, or 90%, of those complaints; 2.9 million female K–
12 students generated 317 of them, while 170,526 women playing college 
sports produced 58 complaints.68  The authors of the NWLC study 
hypothesized that the significantly higher rate of complaints generated by the 
college women “likely reflects high school students’ lack of knowledge about 
Title IX and their rights under the law.”69 
The complaints filed by females, consisting of both K–12 students and 
college students, most often alleged inequitable treatment of girls’ or women’s 
teams.70  An illustrative example is the athletic program at Holt High School 
in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, which the NWLC study examined in May 2005.  
Comparisons of (1) the boys’ baseball team and the girls’ softball team and (2) 
the boys’ and girls’ basketball teams demonstrated the problem.  The baseball 
team played on a newly upgraded field, complete with renovated dugouts, a 
bullpen, and a batting cage, while the softball team used a field and batting 
cage that were inadequately maintained and lacked a bullpen, admissions gate, 
 
64. Id. at 187. 
65. Porto, supra note 2, at 32. 
66. BRAKE, supra note 4, at 201. 
67. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 2, at 1. 
68. Id. at 3–4. 
69. Id. at 2. 
70. Id. at 3–4. 
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and freestanding concession stand.71  The baseball team enjoyed a locker 
room with heat, air conditioning, and plumbing, but the softball team was 
forced to use a locker room that lacked all those amenities.72  The baseball 
team wore new game uniforms provided by the school, which also provided 
the boys’ practice uniforms, whereas each softball player had to purchase her 
own game uniform at a cost of approximately $150, and the school furnished 
no practice uniforms either.73  The baseball players also benefited from newer 
equipment, while the softball players had to make do with older equipment, 
including a “catcher’s helmet that presented a safety hazard because it did not 
fit the team’s catcher.”74 
Similar inequities existed between the boys’ and girls’ basketball teams.  
The boys’ team had a locker room that was separate from the locker room 
used by the boys’ physical education classes, while the girls’ team shared a 
locker room with the volleyball team and the girls’ physical education 
classes.75  The boys’ team wore matching home and away uniforms, with 
warm-up pants, and received gym bags in which to carry their uniforms, but 
the girls wore mismatched uniforms.76  The boys’ team always had a driver to 
transport it to away games, but the girls missed some away games because no 
bus driver was available.77  Furthermore, some girls’ teams at Holt had to start 
their competitive seasons later than other area teams because their head 
coaches doubled as assistant coaches for boys’ sports.78  And when not 
enough athletic trainers were available to attend the competitions of all Holt 
teams on a particular day, the boys’ teams got first priority.79   
In contrast, at the college level, complaints to OCR about sex 
discrimination against women in sports were more evenly divided between 
allegations of inequitable treatment (40 of 105 or 38%) and lack of 
participation opportunities (25 of 105 or 24%), respectively.80  The sports 
most frequently identified as receiving inequitable treatment were softball and 
women’s soccer.81  The category of inequitable treatment most often identified 
 









80. Id. at 9–10. 
81. Id. at 9. 
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in complaints by both K–12 and college students was the facilities where they 
practiced and competed.82 
Discrimination was not the only unhappy circumstance revealed by the 
NWLC study, though.  The study also noted that during the relevant time 
period, OCR received twenty-four complaints of retaliation against K–12 
students (fourteen) or coaches (ten) who had advocated for their teams.83  Half 
of the K–12 coaches who filed complaints with OCR alleged that their schools 
had retaliated against them for their advocacy on behalf of their teams.84  
Moreover, coaches filed thirty-two of the total complaints (K–12 and college) 
that the NWLC studied, half of which alleged retaliation against the 
complaining coach in addition to discrimination against female athletes.85  
And about fourteen percent of the allegations against colleges for violating 
Title IX charged that an institution had retaliated against persons who 
protested sex discrimination in sports.86  The complaining parties in these 
instances were evenly divided between students and coaches.87 
The NWLC study offers powerful statistical evidence of continuing 
discrimination and retaliation related to girls’ and women’s sports.  But 
individual cases often provide more vivid illustrations than statistical data can 
of the emotional pain and derailed careers that can result from blowing the 
whistle on sex discrimination in sports.  No clearer examples of those tragic 
consequences exist than the cases originating at Fresno State beginning in 
2001. 
During much of the 1990s, Fresno State’s athletic department was under 
scrutiny by OCR after an investigation unearthed numerous Title IX 
violations, including large disparities between male and female athletes in 
participation opportunities and inequitable treatment of women’s teams.88  
Under pressure to comply with Title IX, Fresno State agreed to implement a 
Corrective Action Plan designed to increase the support for and enhance the 
status of its women’s sports.89  Nevertheless, in 2001, Associate Athletic 





85. Id. at 4. 
86. Id. at 11. 
87. Id. 
88. Erin E. Buzuvis, Sidelined: Title IX Retaliation Cases and Women’s Leadership in College 
Athletics, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (2010). 
89. Id. 
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department falling short of its obligations under the plan.90  Later, in a 
complaint to OCR, she noted the university’s failure to increase the percentage 
of female athletes, which the plan required, the athletic department’s 
reluctance to devote resources to women’s sports, compensation disparities 
between coaches of men’s and women’s teams, and the denial of “tier one” 
(most-favored) status to women’s sports in violation of the plan.91  Shortly 
thereafter, the new athletic director, Scott Johnson, announced a departmental 
reorganization that eliminated Milutinovich’s position, resulting in her transfer 
to a job at the student union.92 
Volleyball coach Lindy Vivas also raised the athletic director’s ire by 
complaining about the inequitable treatment of women athletes at Fresno 
State.  Specifically, Vivas filed a complaint with OCR, contesting the 
department’s hesitance to elevate volleyball to a tier-one sport.93  She also 
filed a grievance with the university’s human resources department 
challenging disparities in the lengths of the employment contracts for male and 
female coaches.94  After being fired in 2004, Vivas, like Diane Milutinovich, 
sued the university, alleging that her termination was in retaliation for having 
blown the whistle on sex discrimination in the athletic department.95 
As if the Milutinovich and Vivas lawsuits were not enough soap opera for 
one athletic department, a few months after Vivas was fired, the university 
placed on administrative leave and later fired women’s basketball coach Stacy 
Johnson-Klein.96  Like Milutinovich and Vivas before her, Johnson-Klein 
sued Fresno State, alleging that her termination was in retaliation for her 
complaints about a lack of gender equity in the athletic department.97  Diane 
Milutinovich settled her lawsuit with the university in October 2007 for $3.5 
million, but both the Vivas and Johnson-Klein cases went to trial.98  After a 
three-week trial in the summer of 2007, a jury awarded Vivas $5.85 million, 
which the judge later reduced to $4.52 million—to that point the largest 
amount ever awarded in a Title IX case.99  The jury believed Vivas’ claims 
that she was terminated for advocating gender equity, especially, holding the 
 
90. Id. at 10–11. 
91. Id. at 11. 
92. Id.; see also Hostetter, supra note 17. 





98. Id. at 12. 
99. Id. at 12–13. 
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athletic department to its promise to elevate the status of volleyball and move 
the team’s games from a gymnasium to the university’s arena and 
recommending multi-year contracts for successful, long-serving female 
coaches.100  The jury also agreed with Vivas that her termination amounted 
not only to retaliation but to direct discrimination based on her sex and her 
perceived sexual orientation as a lesbian.101  Presumably, Johnson-Klein’s 
testimony on Vivas’ behalf about the athletic director’s plans to “get rid of 
lesbians in the athletic department” in favor of “female coaches who were 
straight and attractive” helped the jury find in Vivas’ favor.102 
Johnson-Klein’s own case produced a two-month trial.103  She presented 
evidence suggesting that the Fresno State athletic director had initiated an 
investigation of her to find a reason to fire her and that the investigation had 
begun shortly after she had threatened to file a complaint with OCR 
concerning the treatment of her team by the athletic department.104  Johnson-
Klein admitted to having made a “poor decision” in asking a player for the 
pain medication Vicadin, but she also showed that she was the victim of a 
sexist double standard in that regard because the university had paid Ray 
Lopes, its former men’s basketball coach, $200,000 to buy out his contract 
after learning that he had helped his players conceal positive drug test 
results.105  Finally, Johnson-Klein presented evidence showing that being 
“straight and attractive” was as much of a burden as a benefit because her 
movie-star looks had caused her to experience harassment (unwanted 
touching, solicitations, etc.) from a male colleague on numerous occasions.106  
The jury awarded her $19.1 million, which the trial court reduced to $6.6 
million, plus costs and attorney’s fees.107  The university appealed, but, in 
June 2008, the parties settled, as the university agreed to withdraw its appeal 
and pay Johnson-Klein $9 million over twenty years.108 
The results of the NWLC study and the retaliation actions litigated after 
the Jackson decision, such as those filed by the former Fresno State 
employees, make clear that, despite Jackson, girls and women continue to 
experience inequitable treatment, double standards, homophobia, and sexual 
 
100. Id. at 12. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 13. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 13–14. 
106. Id. at 14. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
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harassment in interscholastic and intercollegiate sports.109  The retaliation 
actions, in particular, have also alerted judges and juries to these continuing 
violations of Title IX.110  Moreover, these actions have produced favorable 
results for plaintiffs largely because proving retaliation is often easier than 
proving the underlying discriminatory conduct that preceded the retaliation.111  
Still, those results have come mostly from settlements and jury verdicts 
instead of a clear body of law regarding retaliation claims under Title IX.  
Consequently, the lingering question raised by Jackson, which Professor 
Deborah Brake raised in her 2010 book—namely, whether the law will protect 
from retaliation a complainant who mistakenly contends that his or her 
institution has violated Title IX—remains unanswered.112  Part IV will discuss 
the various approaches to answering this question that recent scholarship has 
suggested. 
IV.  SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO A LINGERING QUESTION 
The question whether Title IX will protect the mistaken complainant from 
retaliation has arisen from the Supreme Court’s unstated assumption in 
Jackson that the conduct prompting Roderick Jackson’s complaint was 
unlawful.113  In the Court’s view, retaliation is a form of unlawful 
discrimination; hence, Title IX prohibits it as an extension of the underlying 
discrimination.114  This reasoning is problematic, though, as Professor Brake 
has pointed out, because it suggests that Title IX protects from retaliation only 
those complainants who suffered from retaliation after correctly identifying 
unlawful discrimination at their respective institutions.115  If Title IX was to 
protect only such complainants, it would diverge dramatically from the 
prevailing interpretation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, to which 
courts customarily look for guidance in construing retaliation claims based on 
 
109. Id. at 38. 
110. See id. 
111. Id. at 39. 
112. BRAKE, supra note 4, at 193–96.  Professor Brake also identified two other lingering 
questions after Jackson, namely, (1) what kinds of punishments qualify as “retaliation” under Title 
IX, and (2) whether Title IX can protect a coach or athlete against retaliation by an institution other 
than the one the coach or athlete originally accused of discrimination.  The latter can also be stated to 
ask whether Title IX can protect a coach or athlete who claims that another institution refused to hire 
him or denied her an athletic scholarship in retaliation for having blown the whistle on the original 
institution.  Because of space limitations, this Article will not address these two questions.  Id. at 196, 
198. 
113. Id. at 192. 
114. Id. at 193. 
115. Id. 
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Title IX.116  That is because Title VII does not require complainants to 
correctly identify unlawful discrimination in order to be protected against 
retaliation; instead, it requires them to have a “reasonable belief” that the 
conduct they oppose amounts to discrimination.117 
Unlike Title IX, Title VII includes an antiretaliation provision, which 
prohibits an employer from punishing an employee who has either opposed an 
unlawful employment practice (the “opposition clause”) or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII (the 
“participation clause”).118  Since the Supreme Court’s per curiam decision in 
Clark County School District v. Breeden,119 courts have required plaintiffs 
who bring Title VII retaliation actions under the opposition clause to show a 
“reasonable belief” that the underlying employer conduct about which they 
complained was unlawful discrimination.120  At first blush, this appears to be a 
generous standard for the plaintiff, who may be able to prevail on the 
retaliation issue even if the jury concludes that the underlying conduct of 
which the plaintiff complained was not unlawful discrimination.121 
But recent scholarship reveals that some lower courts have construed the 
reasonable belief standard to implicitly require that the plaintiff-employee 
report actual violations of law.122  One commentator cites, as an example, 
Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp.,123 which held that Title VII did not 
protect from retaliation by the employer an employee who reported a 
coworker’s use of a racial slur because no employee could have reasonably 
believed that the one-time use of a racial slur was unlawful discrimination.124  
Similarly, in her recent book, Professor Brake argues that courts have become 
increasingly strict in interpreting the reasonable belief standard, leaving 
unprotected from retaliation employees whose “knowledge of the law does not 
match that of the courts.”125  She cites, as examples, decisions rejecting 
retaliation claims brought by gay, lesbian, and transgendered plaintiffs because 
the Title VII precedents distinguish sex discrimination, which the statute 
 
116. Id.; see also Burch v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 
117. BRAKE, supra note 4, at 193. 
118. Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New Look at Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation 
Provision, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1469, 1481–82 (2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a)). 
119. 532 U.S. 268, 269 (2001). 
120. Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
375, 388 n.67 (2010). 
121. Gorod, supra note 118, at 1483–84. 
122. Moberly, supra note 120, at 448. 
123. 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006). 
124. Moberly, supra note 120, at 449. 
125. BRAKE, supra note 4, at 193. 
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explicitly covers, from sexual orientation discrimination, which it does not.126 
In this legal environment, Professor Brake continues, Title IX retaliation 
claims brought by students are especially vulnerable to rejection by courts.  
For example, a student may perceive disparate treatment of boys’ and girls’ 
teams in the same sport as a Title IX violation, even though less visible 
practices favoring a girls’ team in another sport offset the disparate treatment 
in the sport that is the subject of a complaint.127  In other words, the law 
measures Title IX compliance by an overall comparison of the male and 
female athletic programs at an institution, not by a sport-by-sport comparison, 
a circumstance that a student complainant may be unaware.128  Similarly, a 
student or coach who suffered retaliation after complaining about unequal 
funding for girls’ and boys’ sports could be left without legal protection under 
a strict interpretation of the reasonable belief standard because Title IX does 
not require financial parity between male and female teams.129  Presumably, a 
court could conclude that the plaintiff’s belief to the contrary was 
unreasonable.130 
According to Professor Brake, applying such a strict interpretation of the 
reasonable belief standard would be a mistake, not only because it would deny 
protection from retaliation to athletes and their coaches but also because that 
standard developed as a limitation only under the opposition clause of Title 
VII, which applies exclusively to employees’ internal complaints about 
discrimination.131  The strict interpretation has not traditionally applied to 
actions brought under the participation clause of Title VII because courts have 
read that clause to, in Professor Brake’s words, “provide stronger legal 
protection that does not depend on the merits of the underlying discrimination 
claim.”132  Moreover, unlike Title VII, Title IX lacks any express provision on 
retaliation and any clause suggesting more limited protection for retaliation 
under some circumstances than others.133  Thus, Professor Brake concludes, 
courts should construe Title IX to “provide the same level of protection from 
retaliation regardless of whether the person complains internally to school 
officials or files a formal complaint with the Office for Civil Rights or a 
 
126. Id. at 193–94 (citing Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701 
(7th Cir. 2000); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
127. Id. at 194–95. 
128. Id. at 195. 
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court.”134 
This conclusion leaves open the question of what standard should replace 
the reasonable belief standard in guiding judicial gate-keeping concerning 
Title IX retaliation claims.  For her part, Professor Brake offers what might be 
called a “good faith” standard.  She writes, “Anyone who, in good faith, 
challenges what he or she believes to be sex discrimination in sports should be 
protected from retaliation under Title IX.  Otherwise, standing up for Title 
IX—a risky thing to do under the best of circumstances—could become a risk 
not worth taking.”135 
Professor Brake’s recommended standard in Title IX retaliation cases is 
similar to the standard recommended by recent commentaries concerning Title 
VII retaliation cases.  One such commentary observes that courts would 
“promot[e] respect for the integrity of the rule of law” more effectively by 
omitting an objective reasonableness requirement from the employee’s belief 
that the employer has engaged in unlawful discrimination.136  The 
commentary argues that instead of expecting fast-food workers (who may also 
be high school athletes) to apply the objective reasonableness test, the law of 
retaliation should “protect employees who speak in good faith, who do not 
willfully abuse a reporting system or act with malice, or who repeatedly bring 
the same complaint for the same alleged act.”137  A second Title VII 
commentary arguing for a good faith standard asserts that Title VII should 
protect an employee from retaliation unless the employer could show that the 
employee had lodged a complaint in bad faith.138 
Professor Richard Moberly has suggested a conceptual structure within 
which to house the various good faith alternatives identified above.  That 
structure is what Professor Moberly calls the “Antiretaliation Principle,” 
which, he maintains, “focuses on the notion that protecting employees from 
retaliation will enhance the enforcement of the nation’s laws.”139  In his view, 
the Supreme Court’s retaliation jurisprudence involving statutory 
interpretation during the past fifty years (including Jackson) has conveyed a 
clear message that “employees play an important role in enforcing statutory 
laws and the Court will provide employees broad protection from retaliation in 
 
134. Id. at 195–96. 
135. Id. at 196. 
136. R. George Wright, Retaliation and the Rule of Law in Today’s Workplace, 44 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 749, 756 (2011). 
137. Id. at 757. 
138. Gorod, supra note 118, at 1474. 
139. Moberly, supra note 120, at 378. 
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order to enhance enforcement of those laws.”140  According to Professor 
Moberly, the majority opinion in Jackson explicitly adopted the Antiretaliation 
Principle when it stated that unless retaliation is prohibited, the enforcement 
scheme for Title IX will “unravel.”141  
Viewed in this way, the Jackson decision fits neatly into the Supreme 
Court’s retaliation jurisprudence, which focuses on protecting employees from 
retaliation so that they will be encouraged to report illegal conduct.  The Court 
assumes that employees’ reports will aid law enforcement by alerting 
authorities to unlawful discrimination, thereby deterring employer 
violations.142  In keeping with this emphasis on facilitating law enforcement, 
Professor Moberly recommends replacing the current reasonable belief 
standard with a more relaxed version that would “simply encourage employees 
to come forward with information that a reasonable person with their 
knowledge and educational experience would believe to be a violation of the 
law.”143  “Society would be better off,” he concludes, “with knowledgeable 
decision[-]makers determining whether the disclosed, questionable conduct 
violates the law after an employee’s report, instead of lay employees trying to 
determine legality before they report.”144 
Thus, as the foregoing discussion has shown, the reasonable belief 
standard used in Title VII cases is neither the only nor, necessarily, the best 
one for judging whether the plaintiff in a Title IX retaliation action genuinely 
thought he or she was blowing the whistle on unlawful conduct when lodging 
a complaint about perceived sex discrimination.  Part V of this Article will 
offer alternative standards that are more compatible with Title IX and the 
Supreme Court’s retaliation jurisprudence. 
V.  A “CONTEXTUAL REASONABLENESS” OR GOOD FAITH STANDARD 
SHOULD APPLY IN TITLE IX RETALIATION CASES 
Courts should reject the reasonable belief standard in Title IX retaliation 
cases for three reasons.  First, it does not fit the interscholastic or 
intercollegiate sports context from whence Title IX claims arise because the 
presumptive complainants, like the fast-food workers alluded to earlier, may 
not understand what is and what is not unlawful discrimination under the 
statute.  The athletes are young and likely to be unsophisticated in legal 
 
140. Id. at 392; see, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); 
Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271 (2009). 
141. Moberly, supra note 120, at 422 (quoting Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180). 
142. Id. at 430. 
143. Id. at 451. 
144. Id. at 449 (emphasis added). 
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matters; hence, they may well overreact to perceived inequities that do not 
amount to unlawful discrimination.  They may also be eager to earn or to 
retain athletic scholarships or playing time, leaving them vulnerable to 
retaliation by a coach or athletic director.  Coaches, too, may be 
unsophisticated about legal issues affecting the games they teach, especially 
when young and inexperienced; under these circumstances, coaches, like 
athletes, who challenge conduct they think is unlawful could well be subject to 
retaliation.  Unfortunately for these coaches and athletes, the reasonable belief 
standard in Title VII retaliation law does not take into account the subjective 
circumstances of the complainant in determining whether that person acted 
reasonably in challenging the complained-of conduct.145  Instead, the view of 
“reasonableness” that customarily governs is that of one who knows the 
lawnamely, the judge.146 
Second, the reasonable belief standard is out of step with the Jackson 
decision’s embrace of Professor Moberly’s Antiretaliation Principle.  That 
principle aims to encourage employers to obey the law; therefore, any standard 
that courts adopt after Jackson should deter unlawful discrimination in 
interscholastic and intercollegiate sports.  But a standard that measures the 
reasonableness of a high school athlete’s belief in the unlawfulness of certain 
conduct by the sensibilities of a middle-aged judge is more likely to deter 
complaints by young athletes than unlawful discrimination by schools and 
colleges.  Indeed, if a school or college retaliates against an athlete with 
impunity, as is predictable under a strict reasonable belief standard, that athlete 
will be unlikely ever to complain again, as will her teammates.  Thus, in the 
wake of Jackson, courts should adopt a standard that is more sensitive to the 
age, maturity levels, and legal sophistication of high school and college 
athletes than the existing reasonable belief standard. 
Third, the reasonable belief standard does not coincide with the Supreme 
Court’s broad reading of Title IX in Jackson or with the canon of statutory 
construction stating that courts should construe remedial statutes, such as Title 
IX, broadly so as to provide plaintiffs with the best opportunity to obtain relief 
for the injuries they have suffered.  After all, in Jackson, the majority did not 
require the plaintiff to show that the defendant school had actually 
discriminated against his players in violation of Title IX.147  And it construed 
the statute’s prohibition against discrimination “on the basis of sex” to include 
retaliation against a coach who complains about sex discrimination suffered by 
 
145. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 99 (2005). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 85. 
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his or her athletes.148 
That reading of Title IX is consistent with the longstanding canon of 
statutory construction stating that a “remedial statute should be liberally 
construed in order to effectuate the remedial purpose for which it was 
enacted.”149  A liberal construction is ordinarily one that applies the statutory 
principle to more subjects or more circumstances than would be the case under 
a strict construction.150  A court may interpret a remedial statute to apply in 
circumstances not specifically considered by the legislature “so long as those 
circumstances are within the ambit of the [statute’s] purposes,” and the court 
should give the terms used in the statute the most extensive meaning to which 
they are reasonably susceptible.151  Common examples of remedial statutes 
are auto insurance legislation, which is liberally construed to give the broadest 
protection possible to accident victims, consumer fraud legislation, and 
whistleblowers’ protection acts.152 
The Jackson Court implicitly acknowledged that Title IX is a remedial 
statute when it observed that “[i]f retaliation were not prohibited, Title IX’s 
enforcement scheme would unravel,” thereby subverting the statutory purpose 
of rectifying discrimination against girls and women in schools and 
colleges.153  Moreover, in litigation during the 1990s between college women 
and their institution regarding athletic participation opportunities, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit observed that “Title IX was enacted in 
order to remedy discrimination that results from stereotyped notions of 
women’s interests and abilities.”154  Thus, the remedial nature of Title IX 
warrants giving its terms the broadest meaning to which they are reasonably 
susceptible. 
Considering the limitations of the reasonable belief standard and the 
remedial purpose of Title IX, courts should replace that standard with one that 
is more compatible with the statutory purpose.  Accordingly, Title IX should 
protect from retaliation even the plaintiff who mistakenly identifies underlying 
 
148. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179. 
149. NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 60:1 (7th ed. 2008). 
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151. Id. § 60:2. 
152. Id. § 60:1; see, e.g., Shallal v. Catholic Soc. Servs. of Wayne Cnty, 566 N.W.2d 571 (Mich. 
1997) (noting that the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act prohibits future employer reprisals against 
whistleblowing-employees in order to encourage employees to report violations of law). 
153. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180. 
154. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 179 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Brian L. Porto, 
Completing the Revolution: Title IX as Catalyst for an Alternative Model of College Sports, 8 SETON 
HALL J. SPORTS L. 351, 372–73 (1998).  
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institutional conduct as unlawful by using, at a minimum, Professor Moberly’s 
suggested standard, which might be called “contextual reasonableness.”  It 
would ask whether a reasonable person with the plaintiff’s knowledge and 
educational experience would believe that the conduct complained of was 
unlawful.155  Better yet, Title IX should protect this plaintiff unless the 
defendant institution can show that the plaintiff complained in bad faith, that 
is, deceitfully or with a reckless disregard for the truth.156  The latter standard 
is preferable because it is less likely than the former to be diluted by judicial 
notions of what a high school or college athlete should know about the law.  
Still, either alternative would more accurately reflect the athletic context in 
which Title IX retaliation claims arise and the broad remedial purpose of Title 
IX than does the reasonable belief standard currently in effect. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Despite representing a big step forward in the evolution of Title IX 
jurisprudence, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education did not indicate 
how much protection from retaliation Title IX provides if the underlying 
conduct prompting the complaint was lawful.  Presumably, courts will answer 
this question by using the reasonable belief standard of Title VII, which only 
protects the plaintiff who has an objectively reasonable belief that the conduct 
complained of is unlawful.  But this standard is inappropriate for the sports 
context, in which many potential plaintiffs are young and unsophisticated 
about the law.  It is also contrary to the Supreme Court’s historic concern for 
law enforcement and to the principle that courts should construe remedial 
statutes, such as Title IX, liberally.  Therefore, in Title IX retaliation cases, 
when the conduct complained of is lawful, courts should reject the reasonable 
belief standard and protect the plaintiff if either (1) a reasonable person with 
the plaintiff’s knowledge and educational experience would believe that the 
conduct was unlawful or (2) the defendant cannot show that the plaintiff acted 
in bad faith.  Either alternative would be more compatible than the reasonable 
belief standard is with interscholastic and intercollegiate sports and with the 
remedial purpose of Title IX.  The fortieth anniversary of the enactment of 
Title IX presents a wonderful opportunity for courts to adopt a new standard. 
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